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Abstract
In this work, we present Nyx, a system for mitigating Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks by routing critical traffic from known benign networks around links under attack
from a massively distributed botnet. Nyx alters how Autonomous Systems (ASes) handle
route selection and advertisement in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) in order to achieve
isolation of critical traffic away from congested links onto alternative, less congested paths.
Our system controls outbound paths through the normal process of BGP path selection,
while return paths from critical ASes are controlled through the use of existing traffic
engineering techniques. To prevent alternative paths from including attacked network links,
Nyx employs strategic lying in a manner that is functional in the presence of RPKI. Our
system only exposes the alternate path to the networks needed for forwarding and those
networks’ customer cones, thus strategically reducing the number of ASes outside of the
critical AS that receive the alternative path. By leaving the path taken by malicious traffic
unchanged and limiting the amount of added traffic load placed on the alternate path, our
system causes less than 10 ASes on average to be disturbed by our inbound traffic migration.
Nyx is the first system that scalably and effectively mitigates transit-link DDoS attacks
that cannot be handled by existing and costly traffic filtering or prioritization techniques.
Unlike the prior state of the art, Nyx is highly deployable, requiring only minor changes to
router policies at the deployer, and requires no assistance from external networks. Using
our own Internet-scale simulator, we find that in more than 98% of cases our system can
successfully migrate critical traffic off of the network segments under transit-link DDoS. In
over 98% of cases, the alternate path provides some degree of relief over the original path.
Finally, in over 70% of cases where Nyx can migrate critical traffic off attacked segments,
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Do to their high level of impact, combined with low degree of technical complexity,
Distributed Denial of Service, or DDoS, attacks continue to represent one of the largest
unsolved persistent threats on the Internet. Recent successful DDoS attacks by the Mirai
botnet against root DNS providers [39] and core transit links [3] highlight both the lack of
an effective deployed solution to DDoS attacks and the impact such attacks have on critical
network infrastructure. To make matters worse, increased botnet bandwidth has allowed
adversaries to launch attacks against shared transit links located outside of the intended
victim, rather than directly against the victim’s end hosts, an attack methodology proposed
in academic research by Kang [18] and Studer [38], which we call transit-link DDoS.
While DDoS represents one of the oldest and most well known security problems facing the
Internet, research has yet to propose a solution that both provides effective mitigation against
transit-link DDoS attacks and has a realistic deployment scenario. For example, filtering
and prioritization techniques [36, 8, 44, 26, 23, 43] require costly per-stream calculations,
presenting scalability concerns with modern DDoS attacks. Load balancing and CDN backed
solutions [11] become a test of who possesses more bandwidth, the defender or the adversary,
a tenuous proposition in an era of multi-Tbps attack flows, something the Mirai botnet and
it’s variants have repeatedly achieved. More importantly, none of these defenses are capable
to mitigate DDoS attacks launched against the Internet’s transit infrastructure. Attacks such
as Kang’s Crossfire are outside of the threat model considered by current DDoS defenses,
which focused on protecting the last-mile links and provide no protection for transit links.
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Systems such as SCION and SIBRA [46, 6], which integrate DDoS defense into the transit
fabric of the Internet, present promise but require a complete redesign of the Internet, raising
doubt about their deployability in the foreseeable future.
In this work, rather than considering DDoS mitigation as a filtering or prioritization
problem, we approach DDoS mitigation as a routing problem. In our system, called
Nyx, the defending or deploying network, specifically a multi-homed Autonomous System
(AS), isolates critical traffic from attack traffic at a path level, preventing the critical traffic
from competing against malicious traffic for limited resources. An AS deploying our system,
which we term the Deployer AS, when negatively impacted by a DDoS attack will adjust
the routes of outgoing and incoming traffic from a single remote Critical AS, known a priori,
around links degraded by the DDoS attack. The inbound critical traffic will be routed
to non-attacked paths with sufficient capacity using currently deployed routing protocols,
specifically the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). This approach to DDoS mitigation has
several advantages over existing approaches. Instead of filtering, Nyx instead operates
at the route selection level, avoiding costly per-stream decisions. Our system functions
independently of the location of the link actually being attacked, even if that link is outside
of the deployer’s directly connected links, allowing our system to mitigate the impact of DDoS
attacks against transit providers the deployer depends on that would normally be outside of
the deployer’s control. Since our system prevents malicious traffic from DDoS attacks and
benign traffic from Critical ASes from being co-located, our capacity to successfully mitigate
a DDoS attack in not dependent on the volume of malicious traffic, allowing our system to
succeed against today’s large-scale DDoS attacks, often reaching sustained traffic levels of
1 Tbps or more, which no known filtering mechanisms can handle. Lastly, our system
functions using existing routing protocols and protects traffic to and from the
deployer without outside assistance, allowing for a realistic deployment scenario of our
system, unlike prior work presented to combat the problem of transit-link DDoS.
In order to realize Nyx, we address three key challenges. First, we address how the AS
deploying Nyx, which we also call the reactor or deployer AS, can successfully maneuver both
outgoing and incoming traffic off of attacked links. While altering outgoing paths is trivial,
BGP provides the destination no direct way to control incoming paths. We overcoming
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this limitation through the use of currently existing traffic engineering mechanisms, while
controlling path propagation via strategic lying about the networks on a path in an effort
to trigger loop-detection. Our traffic engineering technique, which we call Fradulent Route
Reverse Poisoning, works in the presence of deployed RPKI and is discussed later in Section 3.
Our solution causes more preferable paths, with respect to packet forwarding, to propagate
around, but never actually reaching, the links under a DDoS attack, which we can detect via
observing loss of quality service on the links connected to the deployer when the deployer
does not actually observe attack traffic directly.
Second, our deployer must limit the number of non-critical networks which also change
their best path as a result of adjusting paths used by critical networks or ASes; a property
we term disturbance. Disturbance can result in two undesired scenarios. First, disturbance
can result in malicious traffic also flowing along the alternate path, resulting in the alternate
path itself suffering a DDoS attack. Second, even if the disturbed networks are not sources of
attack traffic, too much traffic from ASes other than the chosen critical ASes might congest
the alternative path, as it is likely not provisioned to handle a large amount of traffic beyond
normal loads. In order to mitigate disturbance, we expand our path propagation control
techniques, preventing propagation of the path to all networks outside of the critical network
and the networks appearing along the alternative path.
(a) Traditional DDoS: The victim AS is
directly targeted
(b) Transit-Link DDoS: Transit ASes up-
stream of the victim is targeted without sending
traffic to the victim, thus nullify the effects of
filtering and throttling techniques employed by
the victim
Figure 1.1: Traditional and Transit-Link DDoS
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Lastly, our system needs to ensure that the resulting alternative path has sufficient spare
capacity to handle traffic from the critical network, along with traffic from any disturbed
networks. If our system detects that the path is struggling to handle the added load, it will
attempt to search for a different alternative path. It accomplishes this by withdrawing the
alternative path and attempting to re-propagate it, avoiding propagating the route to both
links under DDoS attack and the bottleneck links in the previous alternative path. Nyx
does not require knowledge of either the malicious traffic sources (i.e. the ASes containing
malicious bots) or the actual capacity of upstream links to find alternate paths not under
attack.
We demonstrate the ability of Nyx to accomplish all three of these tasks using Internet
scale simulations in which our system attempts to mitigate a variety of DDoS attack
scenarios. We find that it is possible to move critical traffic off attacked links and onto
functional paths in 78% of cases where the primary link connecting the deploying AS to
the Internet is attacked, which we call Traditional DDoS and greater than 98% of all other
cases where the attacked link is upstream of the deployer, which we call Transit-Link
DDoS as illustrated by Kang and Studher with Crossfire and Coremelt [18, 38]. We see
that implementing techniques to limit changes in the best path to the deployer of non-critical
networks reduces unintended path changes to 10 networks on average, as opposed to between
1000 and 5000 networks prior to employing reduction strategies. In addition we find that
our system results in little to no added costs with respect to path length, and does not result
in best paths switching to less economically advantageous routes. Lastly, we demonstrate
that out of the our alternative paths provide some degree of relief from the DDoS
attack in 98% of cases, and we find that we can move the critical traffic impacted by
DDoS attacks onto completely uncongested paths with in at least 70% of the time.
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 will provide relevant background
on DDoS, our threat model, and BGP. Section 3 will present details of our system design,
including design constraints, our approach to DDoS mitigation, and the mechanisms by which
we realize our mitigation strategy. Section 4 will cover details of our simulation methodology
and the results of simulations testing the viability of our system. Lastly, in Section 5 we will




2.1 DDoS and Botnets
Volumetric Distributed Denial of Service attacks degrade the availability of a victim host by
saturating links the host utilizes to send and receive network traffic. DDoS attack traffic
is commonly generated by botnets, collections of compromised end hosts scattered across
the Internet. To carry out such attacks in practice, botnets of unforeseen scales need to
be available to adversaries. Previously, worms such as Conficker [35] spread via malware.
However, recent attacks have leveraged the Mirai botnet [39], which largely consists of IoT-
based devices.
DDoS attacks provide a high level of impact, combined with a low degree of technical
complexity, which has resulted in an increased number of occurrences of attacks. Monitoring
organizations have reported an increase in overall DDoS incidents of 83% from 2015 to
2016 [19]. More troubling, the bandwidth adversaries can harness to conduct DDoS attacks
has been steadily increasing annually. Researchers have observed a more than 140% increase
in attacks of greater than 100Gbps [19] from 2015 to 2016, with Mirai generating over 1
Tbps of malicious traffic on multiple occasions. Historically, traditional DDoS attacks are
where the adversary directs bot traffic directly at the victim network, forcing traffic at the
edge of the victim’s network to be dropped and significantly degrade quality of service and
is illustrated in Figure 1.1a.
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Transit-Link DDoS: Recently, a new DDoS attack strategy has emerged, targeting
core transit links that serve the victim host’s entire network, which we call Transit-Link
DDoS, and is shown in detail in Figure 1.1b. In the wild, transit-link DDoS has been seen in
recent attacks on the major DNS provider Dyn [1], the prominent security journalist Bryan
Krebs with KrebsOnSecurity [2], and the country of Liberia [3]. With transit-link DDoS,
the adversary directs bot traffic upstream of the network that is the ultimate target, which
causes traffic to be dropped far ahead of reaching it’s final destination. In this case, the bots
address their traffic to networks other than the victim, which ensures that the victim cannot
filter the traffic or blackhole it in any way. Examples of these attacks in literature include
the Coremelt attack [38] and the Crossfire attack [18]. The Coremelt attack is a transit-link
DDoS attack that takes any number of N bots participating in the attack and sets up N2
connections between them, inflicting significant damage to the transit core of the Internet.
At the time of Coremelt’s introduction, no other transit-link DDoS attacks existed, but since
then, others have emerged, such as the Crossfire attack. Crossfire, in a method similar to
Coremelt, directs traffic to ”wanted” locations expecting the attack traffic, such that attack
traffic can never be dropped or filtered by targeted ASes along the chosen attack paths,
and in doing so can bring down connections to selected critical servers in the transit-core
simply by congesting their available capacity. Our system, Nyx, addresses transit-link DDoS
directly, alleviating congestion from attacks for a single critical AS in the majority of cases,
and will be discussed in depth in the next section, Section 3 with evaluation in Section 4.
2.2 Inter-Autonomous System Routing via BGP
Before we discuss how Nyx operates, we must review the Internet routing infrastructure,
which despite holding up well for decades, is showing flaws not seen or mitigated when first
designed.Today, the Internet is composed of many autonomous systems (or ASes), sets of
routers and IP addresses each under singular administrative control [17]. Between ASes on
the Internet, the Border Gateway Protocol [30] (BGP) is the de facto routing protocol. It
allows the exchange of information between ASes about routes to blocks of IP addresses,
allowing each AS to have knowledge of how to forward packets toward their destinations.
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BGP is a path-vector routing protocol with policies. This means that routes contain the
path they traverse along with other qualities, and individual routers can define their own
policies for which routes are considered best and used to forward packets. These policies
frequently extend beyond simply choosing the fastest or shortest routes: they allow complex
and flexible decisions based on the relationships between ASes. The decision process tells
the router where to send traffic on a per-AS basis, and at each successive hop, the BGP
routers along the way pick up the traffic and forward it to the destination through other
ASes chosen based on their own policies.
A BGP traffic engineering technique that will be highly relevant to this work is “hole-
punching” [30, 13]. In hole punching, a router advertises both a block of IP addresses and
a de-aggregation of that block, each with different path properties. Since these IP blocks
are technically different, BGP will treat them as routes to different destinations, allowing
for more specific policies for certain blocks of IP addresses. These more specific routes will
automatically be used, as routers always forward on the most specific matching IP block.
Additionally, there is no currently deployed mechanism to prevent a router from falsifying




3.1 Routing Around DDoS
To combat the unmitigated threat posed by transit-link DDoS, we have designed Nyx, a
system that mitigates DDoS attacks by routing traffic between a Nyx deployer and chosen
critical AS known ahead of time, around links degraded by a DDoS attack or other adverse
network conditions. By operating on a per-route basis, rather than a costly per-stream
basis, Nyx utilizes BGP at the deployer to route around DDoS without adversely affecting the
routing information of other ASes and by moving traffic inbound for the critical AS onto new
paths with sufficient capacity to handle the added load. At a high level, Nyx makes attack
traffic from botnets irrelevant achieving the property of botnet-level independence. The
ability of Nyx to route around DDoS and make attack flows irrelevant is illustrated in
Figure 3.1 for Traditional DDoS and Figure 3.2 for Transit-Link DDoS.
Recall that traffic filtering and prioritization are ineffective against modern
DDoS with multi-Tbs traffic flows. Furthermore, the transit-link DDoS attacks proposed
in literature, Crossfire and Coremelt [18, 38], as well as real-world attacks seen against
Liberia [3], do not send their attack traffic directly to the targeted AS, thus eliminating
the possibility of applying any filtering or prioritization technique to incoming traffic since
critical traffic is dropped upstream and typically outside the control of the victim AS. Nyx
approaches the problem differently, by focusing on the problem of route selection, utilizing
normal BGP and traffic manipulation techniques to route around DDoS. By continually
8
(a) Nyx NOT Deployed (b) Nyx IS Deployed
Figure 3.1: Nyx Deployment Against Traditional DDoS
(a) Nyx NOT Deployed (b) Nyx IS Deployed
Figure 3.2: Nyx Deployment Against Transit-Link DDoS
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selecting alternate paths with the ability to handle traffic otherwise due to be dropped on
congested links, Nyx does not rely on existing filtering or prioritization techniques.
3.1.1 Realistic Deployment
Unlike prior systems which mitigate transit-link DDoS via bandwidth contracts [6], Nyx
requires no outside cooperation from other ASes, including the critical AS. Furthermore,
Nyx does not have any knowledge of where attackers originate. Nyx only assumes it knows
the AS relationships via open-source data from CAIDA [4]. In Tables 3.1 and 3.2 we show
the information required and not required by Nyx. In detail, Nyx does not need information
about the bandwidth or capacity of links on the Internet. The simulator which this work
uses to validate Nyx utilizes a bandwidth model for the capacity of links in the topology, but
this information is not known to the deployer AS or Nyx. Our system also does not have
knowledge about the location of bots, which ASes have bots, and where in the internet bots
live; instead, Nyx continues to use packet flow performance as an indicator that the current
path between the critical AS and the deployer AS is congested. When Nyx discovers the
current path is congested, we use our strategies to route around DDoS and attempt to find
via an evolutionary algorithm an alternate path with sufficient capacity, as we will discuss
later in Section 3.4. Finally, Nyx does not need to know what traffic is malicious or benign,
since our system knows the critical AS a priori and treats all traffic from that AS as ”benign”.
By forcing traffic from the critical AS onto a path outside of the sphere of influence of a
DDoS event or other adverse network conditions, malicious traffic is completely irrelevant
due to Nyx’s ability to route around links impacted by malicious botnet traffic, which gives
Nyx the property of botnet-size independence when mitigating DDoS.
Beyond the information Nyx does and does not know, we make the following assumptions
about the deployment of Nyx in practice:
• Nyx should only require the defending AS to deploy Nyx. This means we do not rely
on a full deployment of our system across the Internet to work. This means that our
critical AS will not provide our defender any assistance, nor will any other ASes on the
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Internet, which is a key feature of Nyx that distinguishes our system from any prior
work proposing to mitigate transit-link DDoS.
• Nyx should not negatively impact other ASes. Nyx should not alter any paths outside
of routes to and from the defender.
• Nyx should not significantly impact other ASes normal activities. In order to utilize our
techniques, the AS operator solely needs to be able to control the BGP advertisements
on the routers that are BGP speakers for the deployer AS.
• Nyx should function without any changes to BGP, since the technique we have devised
to manipulate inbound traffic from known critical ASes can be performed only via
adjustment of routing policies at the deployer.
3.1.2 Adversarial Model
In accordance with how traditional DDoS and transit-link DDoS are typically controlled,
our adversary does not control the underlying network structure and is not routing-aware,
thus unable to make routing decisions. Instead, our threat model considers adversaries which
control massive distributed botnets or a subset of hosts with the ability to generate massive
attack flows. With this restriction, the adversary can control the selection of bots for a
particular attack, how much traffic the bots distributed across the Internet will send, and
where in the topology each bot should send its traffic. In our current adversarial model,
we did not consider a global adversary in the design of Nyx; however, we will discuss in
Section 6 future work to address this issue. As mentioned earlier and shown in Table 3.2,
Nyx does not know where the bot ASes live, how much traffic they are sending for a given
attack, or the quantity of malicious bots in a given attack.
In the rest of this section, we will explore how Nyx achieves its three core goals within
the design restrictions we have placed to ensure deployability and resistance to adversaries.
In Section 3.2 we will examine how Nyx adjusts incoming traffic to alternative paths,
which is a functionality not controllable directly within BGP. When Nyx successfully
migrates critical traffic off of links suffering DDoS we call this routing success, and will
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discuss our evaluation of routing success later in Section 4.5. Next, in Section 3.3 we look at
how Nyx reduces disturbance, where ASes outside the the critical AS and those along the
alternative path switch to the alternative path. Finally, in Section 3.4, we establish how Nyx
attempts to maximize the number of instances of where the new link has sufficient capacity
to handle the critical traffic.
3.2 Migrating Critical Traffic
Recall from earlier in Section 2.2 that outbound traffic from an AS is trivial to adjust via
local preferences at the external BGP router; however, manipulating the paths inbound traffic
takes to an AS would typically only be possible via coordination between the ASes on either
end, as existing systems such as SCION and SIBRA do to route around DDoS [46, 6]. Nyx,
however assumes no coordination between the deployer AS and any other AS, specifically
the critical AS. The deployer cannot directly adjust the local preferences of the critical AS to
traverse links which avoid DDoS attacks and other adverse network conditions. We address
this issue by giving the deployer AS the ability to restrict the AS-level paths the critical AS
can take to the deployer to only paths which do not traverse the congested or attacked links
within the topology, such as those affected by traditional or transit-link DDoS attacks. We do
this without restricting the critical ASes connectivity to any other ASes, and without causing
the critical AS to see any less BGP advertisements from ASes other than the deployer. At a
high level, Nyx strives to route around DDoS as illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, where we
show how Nyx makes attack events and congested links irrelevant, as critical traffic headed
to the deployer is forced onto uncongested, alternate paths.
To give the deployer this ability, we have developed a strategy used by Nyx called
Fraudulent Route Reverse Poisoning (FRRP). Nyx employs FRRP to ensure that any
BGP advertisements which propagate to the critical AS, originated by the deployer AS, are
guaranteed to not traverse links that are congested or under attack from DDoS or adverse
conditions such as broken links or surges in bandwidth usage creating congestion. FRRP
takes away the choice of the critical AS to route outbound traffic headed to the critical over
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the attacked links by ensuring advertisements which originate at the deployer do not reveal
the paths with attacked links.
(a) Critical links are congested (b) Lying about paths and ap-
pending ASes to avoid
(c) Loop detection (d) Critical AS now traverses alternate
path
Figure 3.3: Fraudulent Route Reverse Poisoning
In detail, FRRP is illustrated in Figure 3.3 and works as follows: the normal traffic from
the critical AS 3 to deployer AS 1 usually flows over AS 2 from 3, since the critical AS
prefers using AS 2 over AS 4 (shown by Part 3.3a). However, attack traffic has congested
the link from 3 to 2. In order to avoid this link and route the critical traffic over AS 4, the
deployer lies about the path by appending AS 2 to it’s BGP advertisements. The deployer
also appends it’s own AS number to the end of the path, which as we will discuss shortly,
allows FRRP to function under deployed RPKI. When AS 4 receives this path, it advertises
it to AS 3 (as shown in Part 3.3b). When AS 2 sees that itself is in the path advertised
from the deployer, BGP’s built-in loop detection causes AS 2 to not forward it’s route to
AS 1 (shown by Part 3.3c). Thus, the critical AS 3 will no longer see the path to 1 over
2, and it will use it’s only other available path, which is over AS 4 ( shown in Part 3.3d).
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Nyx utilizes FRRP at an Internet-scale to migrate incoming traffic from a chosen critical
AS onto alternate paths in situations where many alternate paths exist.
By using FRRP, we achieve over 98% success for the ability to move traffic off of links
under DDoS. Figure 3.1 shows Nyx both deployed and not deployed against a traditional
DDoS attack, and Figure 3.2 shows Nyx both deployed and not deployed against Transit-
Link DDoS. In both cases, Nyx utilizes FRRP to achieve reactive route selection and subvert
attacked links, rather than relying on filtering or prioritization of traffic from the critical AS.
FRRP under RPKI
When utilizing FRRP, properly deployed resource public key infrastructure (RPKI), also
known as Resource Certification, would typically prevent advertising false routes [21].
However, Nyx addresses RPKI’s effects on FRRP by ensuring that strategic lying in
order to trigger loop detection does not interfere with the route origination process. In
detail, given an originating autonomous system, ASorig and a set of ASes to blacklist,
BLAS = { ASBL1 , ASBL2 , . . . , ASBLN} where ASorig /∈ BLAS, the deployer (the originator
in this case) advertises the following path when using FRRP:
{ ASorig, ASBL1 , ASBL2 , . . . , ASBLN , ASorig︸ ︷︷ ︸
For RPKI
} (3.1)
The new path then propagates through the network along from AS1 to AS3, beginning
at the destination, ASorig, with the blacklisted ASes appended to the end followed by the
originating, or deployer, AS again:
{ AS3, AS2, AS1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Actual Path
,
Packet at Dest︷ ︸︸ ︷
ASorig , ASBL1 , . . . , ASBLN , ASorig︸ ︷︷ ︸
Irrelevant for Forwarding
} (3.2)
This means that when routes are advertised by the originator in Equation 3.1, RPKI will
treat the route as valid since RPKI only checks to ensure the AS that who originated the
route is the last AS in the path. As the path propagates or grows throughout the network in
Equation 3.2, ASes along the path will continue to forward the route as long as the originator
remains in the path. The blacklisted ASes after the originator are irrelevant to forwarding
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since they lie after the destination AS, yet these additional ASes will not use the new path
when receiving the path due to the mechanics of BGP loop detection. Since an AS will
simply scan the entire path for it’s own AS number and upon finding itself in the path, it
will drop the path.
FRRP and Network Connectivity
In order to maintain network connectivity, the deployer still advertises it’s normal paths,
but the FRRP paths will be hole-punched prefixes as discussed earlier in Section 2.2. The
deployer will advertise normal aggregates to maintain connectivity to ASes other than
the critical, and will utilize de-aggregate advertisements for FRRP via hole punching.
FRRP coupled with hole-punching ensures that the deployer running Nyx can successfully
manipulate traffic inbound from the critical AS without losing any connectivity to other
ASes.
As discussed in this section, FRRP gives Nyx the ability to route around DDoS attacks
and adverse network conditions. Whether the alternate paths can handle the added load is
discussed later in Section 3.4. Before exploring this issue, we first examine the ability of Nyx
to reduce the side-effects of utilizing FRRP in the next section.
3.3 Reducing Disturbance
By utilizing FRRP, we may unintentionally alter the preferred paths to the deployer of ASes
other than the critical AS. In the worst case, we alter the path utilized by ASes containing
large numbers of bots, potentially causing DDoS traffic to now flow over the alternate
path. We term this effect disturbance. To address disturbance, we have implemented
two techniques that modify the process of FRRP:
• Selective Advertisement: We first advertise the FRRP path, observing what the most
preferable alternative path from critical AS to the deployer is. We then withdraw the
FRRP path and re-advertise it only to the AS directly connected to the deployer AS
on the preferred alternative path.
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• Path Lining: Using the preferred alternative path, we utilize FRRP to blacklist every
AS adjacent to the path and their customer cone, but not the ASes along the path.
When the blacklisted ASes see the FRRP-originated advertisement, they drop the new
path due to loop detection in the same way that FRRP was used to avoid the attacked
links due to DDoS. By halting the propagation of our alternate path, disturbance is
reduced. Keep in mind, path lining requires no outside cooperation or coordination
from ASes outside of the deployer, since the deployer simply includes the ASes it wishes
to blacklist in it’s fraudulent advertisements.
In our evaluation, to be discussed in Section 4, selective advertisement alone actually
increases the disturbance caused by FRRP, a byproduct of how the path propagates through
the topology. Path lining does, however prevent disturbance, since we are able to add ASes
which we do not want our FRRP-advertised routes to propagate beyond to our list of ASes
to blacklist via BGP loop detection. When employing path lining, we see on average less
than 10 ASes disturbed as a result of the deployer’s actions, which will be discussed further
in Section 4.6.
3.4 Finding Performant Paths
Even when our system finds paths around ASes we want to avoid, the new paths may not
be optimal with respect to available bandwidth along the new path’s links. When we move
traffic from one path to another path, we force the alternate path to carry its original traffic
in addition to traffic from the critical AS and any disturbed ASes. If the new links cannot
support the amount of added bandwidth we are placing on them, we will still experience
congestion, and can even end up in a worse situation than not using Nyx at all.
To counter the problem of moving traffic onto new links without enough bandwidth
capacity, we have developed a searching method to find the most performant paths when
alternate paths exist, which when deployed, will repeatedly use FRRP and path lining
to migrate critical traffic to an alternative path, and then evaluate if congestion is being
experienced. This searching is an evolutionary algorithm, where the fitness function is
packet flow performance over each alternate path. When searching, if the alternative path
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is experiencing congestion, Nyx withdraws the alternative route and repeats the FRRP and
path lining process, but additionally treats the hops along the former alternative path as if
they are experiencing DDoS as well, thus blacklisting them and causing the critical AS to
not route traffic ot the deployer AS over the insufficient alternate paths. In other words,
Nyx repeats the alternative path generating process, avoiding ASes experiencing DDoS and
those who have failed to provide a performant alternative path.
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Table 3.2: Information NOT Needed by Nyx
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How Nyx Works With-
out
Bandwidth/Capacity
of links in the
Internet
Packet flow performance
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tion
Location of malicious
bots and botnets in
the Internet
Nyx continually discovers
alternate paths until a path
with sufficient capacity is
found, without ever know-
ing the attack sources
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Nyx considers traffic from
critical AS, known ahead of
time as, ”benign”, without






To evaluate the effectiveness of our system, we built our own BGP simulator, which has
been used in prior work by Schuchard et. al 1 [33]. The simulator is essentially a collection
of software routers who speak BGP configured in a realistic topology. The topology used in
the simulation is from CAIDA’s AS relationships dataset taken from December of 2016 [4].
The BGP policies used by the simulated routes match the current best practices used by
operators. Additionally, we have used three bandwidth models, covered in Section 4.2, which
are used to calculate link capacities, and two botnet models, which are used to calculate
attack volumes available to each attacking AS throughout our simulation. We will show
later in Section 4.7.2 that our system is resilient to changes in these models.
Using our simulator, we can examine both the effectiveness and cost of a deployer using
Nyx, which we refer to as the deployer AS, to migrate critical traffic off of links suffering
from DDoS or adverse network conditions. Our experiment repeatedly picks two random
ASes from the Internet’s default-free zone, which are ASes that are not stub ASes, and fixes
one of the ASes as the deployer AS and the other as an AS generating critical traffic (i.e. the
critical AS mentioned earlier). We then simulate the deployer attempting to respond with
Nyx to a DDoS attack that is impacting links on the current best known path between the
deployer and critical AS.
1Source code at https://volsec.eecs.utk.edu/nyx
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When simulating a DDoS attack, we measure the used capacity of links on the best path
between the deployer and critical AS in two cases by simulating traffic flow through the
Internet: (1) we measure the used link capacity after the attacks effects have congested a
link but before we have used Nyx to migrate traffic off links, (2) we measure after we use
Nyx to migrate traffic onto an ideally more performant path. We call the used link capacity
for a given link the subscription factor of that link, and we calculate these values using a
combination of our bandwidth model, which we will discuss in the next section, Section 4.2,
two constant fixed values varied between simulations that we call the ”Bandwidth Tolerance”
and ”Congestion Factor”, and the number of IPs in bot ASes that are attacking the deployer
AS per run. The number of IPs per bot AS is determined via the earlier mentioned botnet
models we use, which we will discuss further in Section 4.3.
The aforementioned bandwidth tolerance and congestion factors for inform us of whether
our system can hold up under varying attack strengths. The bandwidth tolerance for
the link between any given AS pair is a constant value between 1 and 2 that describes how
much additional capacity the link has based on a normal capacity of 1.0. For example, if
the bandwidth tolerance is 1.5, then the AS can handle 50% more traffic than it’s normal
capacity of 1.0, where any higher than 1.0 means that link is congested and may drop traffic
flowing over it.
The congestion factor is a value that is specific to a simulation instance. The congestion
factor informs the simulator to send an amount of traffic to the current link we are simulating
an attack on that would put the traffic flowing over that link at such a congestion factor.
In our simulation, a value of 1.0 for the amount of traffic on a link is the max capacity, and
anything over 1.0 means it is congested. We vary our congestion factors between 2.0 and 5.0
over runs, in order to simulate a moderate amount of congestion and a significant amount
of congestion.
In order to calculate the pre- and post-traffic migration subscription factors, we need to
calculate normal traffic levels flowing over every link in the topology. Using our bandwidth
model, we get a predicted level of traffic that should flow over each link, which is then
multiplied by the bandwidth tolerance to give us the normal traffic values for that link.
Using our botnet model to determine the magnitude of bots per AS, which we will discuss
20
in in Section 4.3, we then direct bot traffic at the links between the critical and deployer
AS in the case of transit-link DDoS, and at the deployer AS itself for traditional DDoS, by
allocating traffic first to the ASes with the most bots. With the combination of the normal
traffic over the deployer-critical links and the bot traffic from the DDoS attack impacting
them, we calculate our pre-subscription factor as a value above 0.0, where less than 1.0 means
the link is uncongested, and above 1.0 means the link is congested. After we utilize Nyx to
move traffic off the impacted links and ideally onto more performant paths, we flow traffic
again in our simulator and calculate the post-subscription factor, which we use to determine
our performance success metric.
We use our congestion factor as a proxy for packet loss, and we use path length as a
proxy for latency. Modeling latency on the Internet itself is extremely difficult for massively
distributed systems; therefore, we adopt the common notion of using path length as a
proxy metric for latency, since we can measure path length easily within our simulator
since the simulator knows the current Internet topology. Nyx must also know the topology
to find alternate paths via our evolutionary algorithm for capacity alleviation, where an
individual AS can gather this data from known open source datasets updated frequently via
organizations such as CAIDA [4] or gather this on its own via targeted traceroutes. Table A.1
in the Appendix shows a summary the information visible to our Internet simulator, and
illustrates that Nyx and the deployer AS know very little in practice, which is shown in
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 earlier in Section 3.
4.2 Bandwidth Model
We recognize that establishing a complete and irrefutable bandwidth model for the modern
Internet is an unsolved problem without wielding large-scale collaboration from nearly all
existing ASes; therefore, we have developed what we believe to be an accurate and generalized
model that effectively allows us to assign bandwidth capacities to links on the Internet. In
addition to this model, we have tested our system with two simpler models, one based on
the degree of ASes and one on the total IPs associated with ASes, and we show that it works
effectively with simpler models later in Section 4.7.2.
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To achieve this, we need an Internet scale model of where traffic originates from, where its
destination is, and how much of it there is. We base our model on existing work, specifically
that of Gill et al. [12], supported by the measurements of Labovitz et al. [20], the World
Bank [42], PeeringDB [29], and Sandvine [32]. We call this model the Inferred Model, as we
have used known and reputable Internet-wide data to assign approximate traffic constraints
to links in the Internet known solely to the simulator, and not by the Nyx deployer.
In order to establish the relative values of traffic leaving and entering ASes three data
sets were combined. Sandvine provides the amount of bandwidth consumption from an
“average” user in various regions [32]. This information was combined with the World
Bank’s estimation of the number of Internet users in each country to get relative inbound
and outbound bandwidth on a per nation state basis [42]. In order to assign that bandwidth
to ASes, we first assigned each AS to the nation state it primarily resides in using IANA’s
assigned AS numbers [14]. We then consulted PeeringDB, which is a system that allows ASes
to advertise their willingness to peer with other ASes [29]. ASes which elect to participate
in PeeringDB have the ability to optionally disclose the average amount of inbound and
outbound bandwidth from their AS that peers should expect. Of the roughly 55,000
ASes which exist in our , where our topology is built based on CAIDA’s AS relationship
dataset [4], just over 8,000 report bandwidth estimates exist. In order to establish relative
bandwidth values between all ASes, a Decision Tree classifier was trained based on AS
features including AS degree, the AS customer cone size, the AS’s primary country of
operation, and the size of IP space advertised by the AS using Scikit-Learn, a popular
machine-learning framework [28]. The resulting classifier had a correlation coefficient of
0.89, indicating that the PeeringDB data combined with additional AS information models
bandwidth estimates with high accuracy.
Again, we recognize that our inferred bandwidth model is not perfect, but currently no
literature has established a model for bandwidth sufficient for approximating traffic levels
across the entire Internet.
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4.3 Botnet Model
For simulating attacks on links in our topology, we have three botnet datasets. The first
dataset comprises 2.9 million unique Mirai [39] hosts, observed between August 2016 and
June 2017, which we call our Mirai Botnet model. This model was gathered by a Chinese
CDN with a passive scanner setup to detect connections from IPs on known Mirai ports [27].
Given that the Mirai botnet caused massive failures of systems on the Internet in transit-link
attacks, as seen in the DynDNS attack and in Liberia being knocked offline [1, 3], we use
this botnet so that we can simulate Nyx standing up against a DDoS attack generated by
the same model in which nearly all modern DDoS defenses have recently failed to protect
against. For Mirai, the distribution of bots among ASes reveals that the majority of bots are
clustered in a relatively small number of ASes, as see in Figure A.1 as seen in the Appendix,
with less than 50 bots in over 97% of ASes with at least one bot. Note, that in Figure A.1,
the y-axis is trimmed to only show ASes with bot quantities of over 97% of the total botnet
size.
The second is a dataset of 23 botnet families collectively known as Conficker, which were
observed launching DDoS attacks between late August 2012 and March 2013 with a total
of 2.2 million unique hosts [40]. This data was gathered by enumerating all of the botnets
Command and Control domains in advance based on exposed code from the botnet variant,
and then track the hosts contacting the domains. The distribution of the host-based botnet
is nearly identical to Mirai as shown by Figure A.1 in the Appendix, with again less than 50
bots in over 97% of ASes.
The third and final botnet dataset is a fully distributed botnet where every AS in the
topology, except for the current deployer and critical AS, is a bot AS with the ability to
send malicious traffic. We use this final botnet model to prove that Nyx is able to mitigate
transit-link and traditional DDoS even when facing a fully distributed adversary.
In our simulator, when we iterate over each link of the original path between the deployer
and critical ASes, we direct the traffic of the bot ASes to the deployer side of the current
link if and only if the bot ASes best paths to every other AS in the Internet travels over the
current link, thus modeling the Crossfire attack by Kang et. al. [18] popularizing transit-link
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DDoS by setting up an NN amount of connections between bots, where N is the number
of bots in the current botnet model that can flow over the currently attacked link. This
ensures that out of all the bot ASes we have in each bot dataset, we only use the subset
of bots that can direct traffic either flowing over the attacked transit-link, in the case of
transit-link DDoS, or the deployer AS, in the case of traditional DDoS. In our evaluation,
we show graphs from both datasets, illustrating Nyx’s resiliency to choice of botnet model.
4.4 Attack Scenarios
In our simulation, we aim to mitigate attacks and protect the deployer AS in two distinct
DDoS attack scenarios:
• Transit-Link DDoS: In this scenario, the bots in our dataset target links upstream
of the deployer AS as described above. This is the primary scenario and most closely
represents transit-link DDoS, where attacking ASes do not directly address attack
traffic to the victim AS, and instead try to block up links outside of their direct sphere
of influence. Success in moving traffic to less congested links in this scenario means
that our system can effectively mitigate transit-link DDoS. Recall, the deploying AS
cannot filter or prioritize traffic when under transit-link DDoS, as shown earlier in
Figure 1.1b.
• Traditional DDoS: In this scenario the bots in our dataset directly target the deployer
AS using the bots that actually have paths to the deployer. This scenario is the more
difficult of the two scenarios, and success here is a major improvement to current DDoS
defenses. Here, instead of measuring our routing success in terms of distance to the
deployer, we are actually measuring the routing success against attacked segments
starting with the deployer AS. In this scenario, bots not only address their traffic to the
deployer AS directly, but to every segment of hops between the deployer and critical
AS; therefore, it is worth noting that less bot ASes have paths to long segments of
ASes within the default-free zone of the Internet, as opposed to a given transit core
AS.
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As we will show in the rest of this section, we are largely insensitive to the scenario
chosen, which illustrates that we are able to defend against the two major forms of DDoS
attacks seen today. Now, we will explore our ability to migrate incoming traffic off their
original paths, then show how we can migrate incoming traffic without disturbing significant
numbers of neighboring ASes along the deployer-critical AS path, and finally reveal that we
can migrate traffic off impacted links onto links that are less congested or totally uncongested
relative to the original best path.
4.5 Can Nyx Migrate Traffic Onto Links Not Impacted
by DDoS Attacks?
(a) Percentage routing success
for both attack scenarios for the
Mirai botnet.
(b) Percentage routing success
for both attack scenarios for the
Conficker botnet.
(c) Percentage routing success for
both attack scenarios for the Fully
Distributed botnet.
Figure 4.1: Routing Success for the Mirai, Conficker, and Fully Distributed Botnet models.
Nyx is able to find valid paths and move incoming traffic onto around impacted links with
a great degree of success, which is the first step in mitigating transit-link and traditional
DDoS of the volumes where current systems fail. We use our simulator to measure this result
for both types of DDoS scenarios, and we label this result as routing success.
As shown in Figure 4.1a, our system achieved nearly 100% routing success over all
simulation runs when using FRRP with selective advertisement and path lining to influence
the incoming traffic from ASes between 2 and 8 hops out from the deployer. This means
that when transit-links upstream of the deployer AS are being targeted, the deployer AS can
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(a) Path Length Increase for Transit-Link
Attack
(b) Path Length Increase for Traditional Attack
Figure 4.2: Path length increase for both attack scenarios for Mirai, Conficker, and Fully
Distributed botnets.
successfully cause incoming traffic from a chosen critical AS to move around the impacted
links.
Not only can we do so with very high success when transit-links are attacked, but when
we are under a traditional DDoS attack, our success in routing incoming traffic was above
78% at the extremely low end, and nearly 100% when migrating traffic off links 2 hops or
greater away from the deployer itself. This means that as an attacking botnet targets the two
links closest to the deployer AS on the path from the deployer to critical AS, the deployer
can migrate traffic from that critical AS around the two impacted links with nearly 100%
success.
In Figure 4.1b, we show that we can migrate incoming traffic off of nearly any arbitrary
link in the Conficker model, and not only when under attack from the Mirai botnet. In this
case, our success is also above 98% for hops between 2 and 8 out from the deployer, both
when upstream transit-links are under attack and when the deployer is directly under attack.
Finally, we see that Nyx can migrate incoming traffic from the critical AS nearly 100%
of the time when under attack from a globally distributed botnet, as shown by Figure 4.1c.
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4.5.1 Modeling Latency
Recall that we use the widely accepted notion of path length increase as a proxy for increased
latency while modeling our system. In practice, measuring the latency of chosen, alternate
paths on the Internet depends heavily on the layer 1 technologies uses, such as the physical
cables between ASes, as well as geographical distance between ASes, and the quality of the
hardware running the BGP daemons.
We see path length increases of greater than 5 hops in only 2% of runs, and for 94% of
runs, we see no path length increase, which is shown in Figure 4.2 regardless of the botnet
model used. This is significant as well, because now we additionally do not cause incoming
traffic to take longer paths to the deployer AS when traveling around impacted links due to
the influence of Nyx. Figure 4.2 also shows the path length increase when using the Conficker
and Fully Distributed botnet models, which is roughly equivalent and illustrates that Nyx
is resilient to changes in the botnet model with respect to path length increases, even for a
globally distributed botnet.
Routing success can be achieved independent of whether the new path is actually more
congested than the original path, and routing success where the network congestion is
alleviated on the new path is discussed later in Section 4.7. In the next section, we discuss
how we address the second challenge described earlier in Section 3, disturbance mitigation.
4.6 Can Nyx Migrate Traffic Without Disturbing Other
ASes?
Despite being able to migrate incoming traffic onto new paths outside of the influence of
a major DDoS attack, we discovered that the FRRP technique used by Nyx disturbed
significant numbers of ASes. To overcome the problem of disturbance, we introduced two
strategies in Section 3.3: selective advertisement and path lining. When utilizing those
strategies in unison, we significantly lessened the disturbance to the ASes close to the deployer
AS when Nyx was employed to migrate incoming traffic.
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(a) Disturbed ASes for Transit-
Link Attack for Mirai
(b) Disturbed ASes for Transit-
Link Attack for Conficker
(c) Disturbed ASes for Transit-
Link Attack for Fully Distributed
Botnet
(d) Disturbed ASes for Tradi-
tional Attack for Mirai
(e) Disturbed ASes for Tradi-
tional Attack for Conficker
(f) Disturbed ASes for Tra-
ditional Attack for Fully Dis-
tributed Botnet
Figure 4.3: Disturbed ASes with and without disturbance mitigation for all botnet models
for Traditional and Transit-Link DDoS
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As shown in Figure 4.3, before employing any strategies to mitigate disturbance, we
disturbed between 1,000 and 6,000 ASes nearly 90% of the time, which in the modern
Internet is roughly 10% of all existing ASes 2. This is true when under either attack scenario:
transit-link DDoS or traditional DDoS. When we implemented selective advertisement alone,
we did not see the disturbance drop, which indicated we needed to try another strategy.
Then, we implemented path lining as described in Section 4.6, and brought the number of
disturbed ASes to less than 10 disturbed ASes on average. Using path lining and selective
advertisement, we effectively mitigated the disturbance of ASes in the default-free zone, thus
reducing the deployment costs of Nyx when both upstream transit-links are attacked and
when the deployer AS is targeted directly. Furthermore, for each of those ASes, Nyx also
disturbed the IPs residing within them, as they may see new routes taken for traffic being
sent. This is shown in Figure A.2 in the Appendix, since the story is roughly the same as
the disturbance in ASes.
In summary, by employing our disturbance mitigation techniques, we are able bring the
costs of disturbance to virtually zero in nearly 90% of cases. In the next section, we will
discuss local preference disturbance.
4.6.1 Are There Any Local Preference Changes?
The cost of link usage from one provider to another provider in the actual Internet are closely
guarded secrets; therefore, we use the act of switching onto a peer- or provider-learned path
as a proxy for added monetary cost. In our simulations, the deployer AS using Nyx never
switches from a customer learned path to peer- or provider-learned path, or a peer-learned
path to a provider-learned path.
4.7 Do the Alternate Paths Have Enough Capacity?
Now that we have shown that Nyx can successfully migrate incoming traffic and do so with
little to no disturbance, we now show that Nyx can migrate traffic onto more performant
and uncongested paths in nearly all cases for transit-link DDoS and a majority of cases in
2As of October 2017, the number of ASes according to CAIDA’s Internet topology was roughly 58,000.
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(a) Weak Performance Success
with No Searching for the Mirai
Botnet and Normal Bandwidth
Model
(b) Strong Performance Success
with No Searching for the Mirai
Botnet and Normal Bandwidth
Model
(c) CDF of Post-Subscription
Factor with No Searching for
the Mirai Botnet and Normal
Bandwidth Model
(d) Weak Performance Success
with Searching for the Mirai
Botnet and Normal Bandwidth
Model
(e) Strong Performance Success
with Searching for the Mirai
Botnet and Normal Bandwidth
Model
(f) CDF of Post-Subscription
Factor with Searching for the
Mirai Botnet and Normal Band-
width Model
Figure 4.4: Performance success metrics for the transit-link attack scenario with and
without searching.
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traditional DDoS. In order to measure performant paths, we use several bandwidth tolerances
and congestion factors, as discussed in Section 4.1. We additionally show that our system
has the ability to search for performant paths as described in Section 3.4, which greatly
enhances the success of migrating onto uncongested paths after a DDoS attack.
Our system achieves performance success in two distinct ways: when the post-
subscription factor is less than the original subscription factor, and when the post-
subscription factor is less than 1.0 (indicating that we have completely alleviated congestion
from either an original subscription factor of 2.0 or 5.0 to less than 1.0). The bandwidth
tolerances are between the range of 1.0 and 2.0, which model links where the capacity might
actually have more room than our bandwidth model dictates, and this tolerance is applied
across all of our simulations.
As shown in Figure 4.4, when the deployer AS is under transit-link DDoS, we are able
to find paths more performant than the pre-attack path on average in over 90% of cases
without searching for the hardest setting of bandwidth tolerance and congestion factor, but
with searching as shown in Figure 4.4d, our performance success is essentially 100% for all
distances from the deployer AS. This means that no matter how far out a transit-link is
being attacked, we can alleviate some amount of congestion in nearly 100% of cases. But
what about alleviating all of the congestion?. We show this in Figure 4.4b without searching,
where we are still able to find performant paths that are completely uncongested as compared
to an original congestion of 5 times more than the capacity in over 89% of cases on average.
When we employ searching in Figure 4.4e, we bring that average up to over 95% on average
for the hardest setting of bandwidth tolerance at 1.1.
These results indicate that when transit-links are under a DDoS attack upstream of the
deployer AS, we can guarantee no traffic loss for a particular critical AS in over 95% of cases.
To state it in another way, we give the deployer the ability to operate under normal conditions
for traffic being delivered from some critical network despite the transit-links between the
deployer and critical network sustaining attack traffic loads of arbitrary amounts.
For transit-link DDoS with and without searching, we also show the post-attack
subscription factors in Figure 4.4c and 4.4f, which indicates that for over 95% of cases we
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can migrate traffic onto uncongested paths out of the way of any DDoS attacks on upstream
transit-links.
Not only can we protect the deployer AS when it is under transit-link DDoS, but we show
we can protect the deployer AS when it is targeted directly in a traditional DDoS scenario for
the hardest settings of bandwidth tolerance and congestion factor. As we show in Figure 4.5,
we are able to migrate traffic onto links that are more performant than the original paths in
on average 93% of cases, and for strong performance success we can migrate traffic onto paths
that are on average completely uncongested in 75% of cases. When employing searching,
though we see a higher weak performance success in Figure 4.5d, with an average of nearly
98% success in alleviating some amount of congestion, we do not see searching helping nearly
as much for strong performance success, as shown in Figure 4.5e.
Despite this, we demonstrate that using Nyx, even when under a traditional DDoS attack,
with little cost of deployment to an AS and no outside cooperation, we can migrate incoming
traffic onto links that are not impacted by the DDoS at the ASes doorstep, targeted directly
at the deployer, on average 75% of the time, as shown in the CDF of the post-subscription
factors in Figure 4.5f. Why is traditional DDoS the harder case to protect against? The
answer lies in how Nyx utilizes FRRP. When we advertise out our hole-punched paths from
the deployer AS while under traditional DDoS attacks, we can end up dragging along large
amounts of bot traffic that is being addressed directly to the deployer AS, whereas the
bot traffic in transit-link DDoS is never addressed to the deployer AS, and will the bot
traffic will not be dragged towards the deployer AS. Regardless of this side effect, we have
still demonstrated that our system can protect a significant amount of traffic from a chosen
critical AS known ahead of time, which often cannot be done in any capacity with traditional
DDoS defense methods that we will discuss in Section 5.
We show in Figure 4.6, that when our system utilizes searching, the depth to which we
search is small except in greater distances from the deployer. This means that the deployer
does not have to force the BGP speakers implementing Nyx to waste precious time finding
more performant paths around impacted links, and that it can be done in the case of transit-
link DDoS in nearly 0 iterations on average and 14 iterations on average in the worst case
for distances in excess of 8 hops from the deployer.
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(a) Weak Performance Success
with No Searching for the Mirai
Botnet and Normal Bandwidth
Model
(b) Strong Performance Success
with No Searching for the Mirai
Botnet and Normal Bandwidth
Model
(c) CDF of Post-Subscription
Factor with No Searching for
the Mirai Botnet and Normal
Bandwidth Model
(d) Weak Performance Success
with Searching for the Mirai
Botnet and Normal Bandwidth
Model
(e) Strong Performance Success
with Searching for the Mirai
Botnet and Normal Bandwidth
Model
(f) CDF of Post-Subscription
Factor with Searching for the
Mirai Botnet and Normal Band-
width Model
Figure 4.5: Performance success metrics for the traditional attack scenario with and
without searching.
Figure 4.6: Average depth of search for the hardest setting of bandwidth tolerance and
congestion factor.
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We have discussed our results for performance success in the case of bandwidth tolerances
and congestion factors, but how do we show that these values are not chosen simply to
guarantee the success of our system? We show in Figure 4.7, that for the Mirai botnet
model, once our bandwidth tolerance is at 1.1 or higher, the gains received by increasing the
tolerance stabilize and do not increase further. This indicates that regardless of how much
room you give the link capacities around a DDoS attack, the strong performance success does
not increase; therefore, our chosen values in the simulation are not in place to guarantee we
have greater success.
Figure 4.7: Strong performance success over varying bandwidth tolerances. Notice that
once the bandwidth tolerance is greater than 1.1, the overall strong performance success
stabilizes.
For congestion factors, we see only slightly higher performance success for smaller
congestion factors, such as our other tested factor of 2.0, but not by significant amounts.
As shown in Figure 4.8, the smaller congestion factor of 2.0 has little effect on the strong
performance success, where we must migrate traffic onto links that are uncongested. This is
the case when either transit-links are attacked or when the deployer is attacked directly.
Given these results, our simulation’s choice of congestion factor indicates that you can
continue to congest links on the normal path between the deployer and critical AS and
still be able to successfully migrate traffic around the impacted links, while still alleviating
congestion.
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(a) Strong Performance Success for
Transit-Link Attack for CF of 2.0
(b) Strong Performance Success for
Traditional Attack for CF of 2.0
Figure 4.8: Strong performance success with searching for both attack scenarios for
congestion factor of 2.0.
4.7.1 Is the Performance Success of Nyx Insensitive to the Botnet
Model?
In Section 4.3, we described three botnet models: Mirai, Conficker, and a fully distributed
botnet. In the previous section, we showed that Nyx significantly mitigates the effects of
Traditional DDoS and nearly defeats any congestion due to Transit-Link DDoS when the
adversary controls a botnet with the size and topology of Mirai. However, Nyx performs as
well with other models, including Conficker, which has a distribution and cardinality similar
to Mirai (see Figure A.1), and a fully distributed botnet. For Conficker, the results are similar
in success to Mirai and are shown in the Appendix in Figure B.1. For the fully distributed
botnet, Nyx achieves strong performance success in 99% of cases on average for Transit-
Link DDoS for the hardest settings of bandwidth tolerance and congestion factor, and 78%
strong performance success on average for Traditional DDoS as shown in the Appendix in
Figure B.2. This means that a globally distributed adversary, such that essentially every
AS in the modern Internet possesses bots that can send attack traffic upon command, can
be subverted by routing around the DDoS events with Nyx, deployed at a single AS and
without outside cooperation from other ASes.
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4.7.2 Is Nyx Insensitive to the Choice of Bandwidth Model?
In Section 4.2, we described the main bandwidth model used in our evaluation. This model
is fairly complex, but approximates the typical traffic levels on existing ASes through the
application of several well-known datasets of AS-level and geographic data, which is needed
because the real link capacities between major ASes are a in many cases a closely guarded
secret. To evaluate our system’s ability to still work with simpler models, we have built two
other bandwidth models that influence our system’s performance success (i.e. the ability to
reduce congestion on the new routes chosen after successfully migrating traffic):
1. AS Degree Model: This model chooses the degree of each AS as the traffic factor
value, or the approximation of the traffic sent by a given AS with arbitrary traffic
units, described in Section 4.1. The AS Degree for any given AS is defined as the
number of ASes where the given AS has a direct connection, as inferred from CAIDA’s
AS Relationship dataset [4].
2. AS IP Count Model: This model chooses the number of IPs associated with a given AS
as it’s traffic factor value. The number of IPs associated with a given AS is determined
by the RIPE NCC RouteViews dataset [31].
In Figure 4.9, we show that our system still achieves nearly identical strong performance
success for all tested bandwidth models, with our most complex and standard inferred model
performing the worst overall. For the transit-link DDoS scenario, our models all averaged
around 95% strong performance success, and for the traditional DDoS scenario, our models
averaged around 70% to 75% success. Therefore, by modeling the link capacities on the
Internet as a function of the AS Degree and AS Total IP count, we have achieved similar
results as when we model the link capacities with our more complex, inferred bandwidth
model that attempts to model the true link capacities in the Internet.
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(a) Strong Performance Success for
Transit-Link Attack Scenario for All
Bandwidth Models
(b) Strong Performance Success for
Traditional Attack Scenario for All
Bandwidth Models





Traditional and current defense systems attempt to mitigate the negative effects of DDoS
attacks through a variety of means; however, no systems we found defend against DDoS via
route-altering techniques such as ours. In this section, we will discuss several classes of DDoS
defense systems in recent literature, then we will discuss why these systems fail to protect
against recent transit-link DDoS attacks and massive traditional DDoS attacks leveraging
the Mirai botnet [1, 2, 3], then we will discuss why our system does not suffer from the same
flaws as these existing systems.
Traditional DDoS defense systems that attempt to alleviate DDoS attacks via packet
filtering [25] using techniques such as packet marking [36, 8, 44, 26, 23, 43] and push-back
techniques [45, 22, 24, 16, 5] filter traffic at ingress and egress points on the network, but
are incapable of withstanding DDoS attacks of the size of the Mirai botnet used to test Nyx.
Additionally, transit-link DDoS typically does not send attack traffic directly to the reactor
AS, and instead to upstream links; therefore, filtering on attack traffic would not be feasible
since the victim would not see the traffic. Furthermore, our system can handle massive
inbound flows sent from distributed botnets because not only do we not physically have to
handle malicious traffic in the case of transit-link attacks, but we can arbitrarily manipulate
the paths that attack traffic takes, and by doing so spread the incoming attack traffic across
links upstream of the deployer AS such that no traffic from the critical AS is dropped along
the way.
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Other techniques that filter traffic targeted at specific services [10, 9, 41] are ineffective
against DDoS attacks that attack different services or even the underlying routing infrastruc-
ture. Because all internetwork traffic must be sent over paths determined by BGP speakers,
as simulated in this work, our system is able to reactively alter advertised paths such that
no matter the type of traffic being sent by the adversary, the victim AS will move traffic
from a chosen critical AS onto paths not impacted by the malicious traffic.
Strategies using game-theoretic approaches model the defender’s best case strategy to
maximize cost for an attacker [37, 7], but these approaches are ineffective when massive
DDoS attacks can be launched with the click of a button at little cost to the attacker.
Zhou et. al.’s work to protect the Internet’s backbone and highly connected ASes [48] fails
to defend against transit-link DDoS, since the proposed system only handles traffic once
it reaches the deployed system within the victim AS. Other recent works take this same
deployment approach, where an attempt to detect and model botnet traffic is done at the





In this work we presented a system that can significantly reduce the impact of transit-link
(targeting links upstream of the victim) and traditional (targeting the victim directly) DDoS
when deployed only onto the deployer AS’s BGP speakers. First, we showed that we can
manipulate not only outbound traffic from an AS, but also the paths which inbound traffic
takes. This ability allows our system to intelligently migrate traffic, coming from chosen
critical ASes where we want traffic to always reach us, off links impacted by DDoS attacks
with nearly 100% success. Second, we demonstrated that we can migrate incoming traffic
off of impacted links without disturbing significant numbers of ASes in close proximity to
the AS utilizing our system, with less than 10 ASes on average disturbed by our path
manipulation techniques, as opposed to 1000 to 5000 disturbed ASes on average before
employing reduction methods. Third and most importantly, we demonstrated that we can
migrate traffic off impacted links onto links that are uncongested with over 98% success
for transit-link DDoS and on average 70% success for traditional DDoS, thus causing no
traffic from critical ASes to be dropped even while under a massive attack against the
Internet’s transit core. Ultimately, this work presents an alternative to ineffective filtering
and prioritization methods used against recent DDoS attacks [39, 3, 15], and finally presents




The system we have developed creates many interesting opportunities for future work.
First, our system has demonstrated success with the bandwidth models and botnet models
described earlier, though with our open source simulator, new bandwidth and botnet models
can be rapidly tested. Currently, our system works only for protecting traffic from a single
chosen critical AS, and protecting traffic originating in multiple critical ASes from network
congestion would often be necessary in some operational environments. Furthermore, our
system relies on searching for alternate paths until an uncongested or non-degraded path
is found; however, if the deployer AS had the ability to detect degraded quality of service
along upstream links, our system could make more informed decisions of where to migrate
critical traffic.
Finally, as mentioned in Section 2, our adversarial model does not consider a global
adversary that is routing-aware. This adversarial model becomes important when defenders
want to protect their networks an adversary controlling a significant amount of ASes.
In general, combating a global adversary would require our system to combine all prior-
mentioned future work: protecting multiple critical ASes, the ability to detect upstream
adverse network conditions and congestion without assistance, and utilizing bandwidth and
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A Additional Simulation Details
Figure A.1: Bot Count per AS in the Mirai Botnet and the Host-Based Botnet.
(a) Disturbed IPs for Transit-
Link Attack for Mirai
(b) Disturbed IPs for Transit-
Link Attack for Conficker
(c) Disturbed IPs for Transit-
Link Attack for Fully Dis-
tributed Botnet
(d) Disturbed IPs for Tradi-
tional Attack for Mirai
(e) Disturbed IPs for Tradi-
tional Attack for Conficker
(f) Disturbed IPs for Tradi-
tional Attack for Fully Dis-
tributed Botnet
Figure A.2: Disturbed IPs with and without disturbance mitigation for all botnet models
for Traditional and Transit-Link DDoS
49










Simulator needs to model the
interaction of all known ASes,
and Nyx needs to know ASes
bordering the chosen alternate
paths during path lining
YES
CAIDA AS Relationships [4],






Simulator uses as the primary
bandwidth model to calculate
congestion factors for links in the
topology during simulation,
contains mapping of AS to a
”traffic factor” for how much
traffic that AS sends
NO
CAIDA AS Relationships [4],
PeeringDB [29], IANA [14],
World Bank [42], Sandvine [32],





Used as secondary bandwidth
model for validation, contains a
mapping between every AS to
it’s degree (number of connected
ASes)





Used as secondary bandwidth
model for validation, contains a
mapping of every AS to the
number of total IPs known to
live inside that AS based on
traceroutes from RIPE Atlas
NO Route Views Project [31]
Mirai Botnet
Model
Botnet model used for attack
traffic origination based on the
Mirai botnet between August
2016 and June 2017, contains







model used for attack traffic
origination based on the
Conficker botnet as measured
between 2012 and 2013, contains
ASes with the number of
Conficker infections within them
NO Thomas et al. [40]
Malicious Traffic
Traffic from bot ASes is sent
from the originating bot ASes to
other ASes such that their traffic
flows over the simulator’s
currently attacked link
(upstream of the Deployer AS),
or in the traditional DDoS




B Performance Success of Conficker and Fully
Distributed Botnets
(a) Weak Performance Success
for Transit-Link Attack with
Searching for the Conficker
Botnet
(b) Strong Performance Suc-
cess for Transit-Link Attack
with Searching for the Con-
ficker Botnet
(c) CDF of Post-Subscription
Factor for Transit-Link Attack
with Searching for the Con-
ficker Botnet
(d) Weak Performance Success
for Traditional Attack with
Searching for the Conficker
Botnet
(e) Strong Performance Suc-
cess for Traditional Attack with
Searching for the Conficker
Botnet
(f) CDF of Post-Subscription
Factor for Traditional Attack
with Searching for the Con-
ficker Botnet
Figure B.1: Performance success metrics for both Traditional and Transit-Link attack
scenario, normal bandwidth model, with searching for the Conficker botnet.
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(a) Weak Performance Success
for Transit-Link Attack with
Searching for the Fully Dis-
tributed Botnet
(b) Strong Performance Suc-
cess for Transit-Link Attack
with Searching for the Fully
Distributed Botnet
(c) CDF of Post-Subscription
Factor for Transit-Link Attack
with Searching for the Fully
Distributed Botnet
(d) Weak Performance Success
for Traditional Attack with
Searching for the Fully Dis-
tributed Botnet
(e) Strong Performance Suc-
cess for Traditional Attack with
Searching for the Fully Dis-
tributed Botnet
(f) CDF of Post-Subscription
Factor for Traditional Attack
with Searching for the Fully
Distributed Botnet
Figure B.2: Performance success metrics for both Traditional and Transit-Link attack
scenario, normal bandwidth model, with searching for the Fully Distributed botnet.
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